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Abstract Increasing evidence suggests that perception
and action planning do not represent separable stages of a
unidirectional processing sequence, but rather emerging
properties of highly interactive processes. To capture these
characteristics of the human cognitive system, we have
developed a connectionist model of the interaction
between perception and action planning: HiTEC, based on
the Theory of Event Coding (Hommel et al. in Behav
Brain Sci 24:849–937, 2001). The model is characterized
by representations at multiple levels and by shared rep-
resentations and processes. It complements available
models of stimulus–response translation by providing a
rationale for (1) how situation-specific meanings of motor
actions emerge, (2) how and why some aspects of stimu-
lus–response translation occur automatically and (3) how
task demands modulate sensorimotor processing. The
model is demonstrated to provide a unitary account and
simulation of a number of key findings with multiple
experimental paradigms on the interaction between per-
ception and action such as the Simon effect, its inversion
(Hommel in Psychol Res 55:270–279, 1993), and action–
effect learning.
Introduction
Coordinating our actions in response to environmental
demands is an important cognitive activity. Indeed, actions
that are not guided by perception would not only be inef-
ficient but might also be rather dangerous. In general,
natural environments offer an overwhelming number of
perceivable objects, and natural bodies allow for a virtually
unlimited number of different responses. Intriguingly, our
cognitive system usually seems to cope quite well with this
complexity. It is generally hypothesized that the task
context triggers the implementation of a task set (Monsell,
1996) that focuses the cognitive system on relevant per-
ceptual events and appropriate actions. It is, however,
unclear how such a task set may configure the cognitive
system—in terms of representations and processes—to
effectively coordinate our actions in response to stimuli.
Traditionally, responding to stimuli in our environment
has theoretically been conceived as a sequence of separable
stages of processing (e.g., Donders, 1868; Neisser, 1967;
Sternberg, 1969), such as ‘perceptual analysis’, ‘decision
making’, ‘response selection’, and ‘response execution’
(Ward, 2002). Interestingly, empirical findings in psy-
chology have demonstrated that parts of human informa-
tion processing do not seem to involve conscious cognitive
decision making. Features of perceived objects (such as
location, orientation, and size) can influence actions di-
rectly and beyond (tight) cognitive control, as illustrated by
stimulus–response compatibility (SRC) phenomena, such
as the Simon effect (Simon & Rudell, 1967). In the typical
Simon task, stimuli vary on a spatial dimension (e.g.,
randomly appearing on the left or right) and on a non-
spatial dimension (e.g., having different colors). Partici-
pants are to respond to the non-spatial stimulus feature by
performing a spatially defined response (e.g., pressing a left
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or right key). Although the location of the stimulus is
irrelevant for the response choice, it nevertheless influences
response time and accuracy: participants respond faster
(and more accurately) when the stimulus location is con-
gruent with the response location than when the stimulus
location is incongruent with the response location. This
finding suggests that there is a direct interaction between
stimulus perception and response planning. The Simon
effect is a very robust finding, has been replicated
numerous times and has been used frequently as a
methodological tool to investigate perception, action, and
cognitive control (for general overviews, see Hommel,
2011; Proctor, 2010).
To account for SRC phenomena cognitive theories and
computational models of stimulus–response translation
typically assume the existence of two translation ‘routes’
(e.g., DeJong, Liang, & Lauber, 1994; Kornblum, Has-
broucq, & Osman, 1990; Zorzi & Umilta`, 1995): a con-
trolled route for processing task relevant stimulus features
(e.g., stimulus color) and an automatic route for processing
task irrelevant stimulus features (e.g., stimulus location).
Both routes end in response codes labeled with the
response locations in the task (e.g., ‘left key’ and ‘right
key’). When the relevant stimulus feature and irrelevant
stimulus feature both activate the same response code,
processing is facilitated yielding smaller reaction times;
conversely, when they activate different response codes,
processing is interfered yielding larger reaction times.
Although these process models are typically able to fit
behavioral data quite well, they leave some issues—relevant
for understanding the interaction between perception and
action from a representational perspective—unaddressed.
The three issues we focus on here are: (1) a common
characteristic of these models is the use of response codes
with intrinsic connotations (e.g., direction or location) as
exemplified by their respective labels (e.g., ‘left key’). The
question then arises, how the cognitive system has acquired
this knowledge and how the knowledge is grounded in the
real world. In various empirical studies (e.g., Riggio,
Gawryszewski & Umilta, 1986; Guiard, 1983; Hommel,
1993), it has been shown that this connotation depends on
the task context. So, how may situation-specific meanings of
motor actions emerge? (2) How and why are some task
irrelevant features connected to response codes with an
automatic route? In these models automaticity is simply
assumed if stimuli and responses are ‘similar’ (e.g., ‘‘have
dimensional overlap’’, Kornblum, et al., 1990; Kornblum,
Stevens, Whipple & Requin, 1999) without providing a
theoretical rationale or a concrete mechanism accounting for
similarity. Finally, (3) various empirical studies (e.g.,
Haazebroek, van Dantzig & Hommel, 2013; Hommel, 1993)
show that the task context may substantially influence both
the occurrence and direction of SRC effects.
An influential model that addresses the influence of task
context on SRC effects explicitly in the context of the
Stroop task (Stroop, 1935) has been developed by Cohen,
Dunbar and McClelland (1990). This connectionist model
contains two sets of input units (i.e., red and green ink
color units; and RED and GREEN word units), a set of
intermediate units, and a single set of output units (‘‘red’’
and ‘‘green’’). Input units are activated and activation
propagates through connections, via the intermediate units,
towards the output units. This model too contains two
pathways: one for color-naming and one for word-reading.
When the input to the model consists of a congruent
stimulus, such as the word RED in ink color red, activation
propagates, through both pathways, towards the same
output unit ‘‘red’’. If the stimulus is incongruent, however,
(e.g., the word GREEN in ink color red), activation is
propagated to both the ‘‘red’’ and ‘‘green’’ output units.
Crucially, a set of additional input units, so-called task
demand units, are also connected to the intermediate units.
Their activation modulates which pathway is more domi-
nant in the activation of the output units. By activating the
‘word-reading’ task demand unit, the word is the task-rel-
evant feature and the ink color task-irrelevant, and vice
versa when input is given to the ‘ink color’ task demand
unit. This early model has been successful in simulating a
variety of behavioral data on the Stroop effect and made a
substantial contribution in the modeling of attention. The
model is strictly feedforward, and, in line with the PDP
tradition (e.g., Rumelhart, Hinton, & McClelland, 1986)
considered modular. Indeed, Cohen, et al. (1990) make it
clear that they assume that ‘some other module’ provides
the input for the task demand units. Moreover, the authors
state it has not been their focus to consider how task
interpretation occurs or how the allocation of attention is
determined.
This aspect, and the issues mentioned above, we address
explicitly in the model we propose: HiTEC, a connectionist
model in the same PDP tradition as the models by Cohen,
et al. (1990) and Zorzi and Umilta` (1995). HiTEC is
structured differently, however, containing so-called ‘fea-
ture’ units that are shared by perception and action control.
Also, the connections between these ‘feature’ units and
output units are not fixed, but are acquired through ideo-
motor learning (Hommel, 2009; James, 1890; Lotze, 1852;
Stock & Stock, 2004), which in turn creates stimulus–re-
sponse similarity through sharing of feature codes. More-
over, the model is not strictly feedforward and in that sense
promotes a more dynamic and integrative perspective on
perception and action than the modular views of traditional
connectionist models. The units in HiTEC do not originate
from a specific task or experimental paradigm, they rather
relate to different levels of representation as suggested by
the Theory of Event Coding (TEC, Hommel, Mu¨sseler,
1086 Psychological Research (2017) 81:1085–1109
123
Aschersleben & Prinz, 2001). TEC aims at capturing the
interaction between perception and action in terms of
representations and processes that fit well within common
neural constraints, and the way this interaction is mediated
by cognitive control. HiTEC in turn is based on TECs core
principles: (1) a level of common representations, where
stimulus features and action features are coded by means of
the same representational structures; (2) stimulus percep-
tion and action planning are considered to be similar pro-
cesses, both involve activating these common
representations; (3) action features refer to the perceptual
consequences of a motor action; when an action is exe-
cuted, its perceptual effects are associated with the active
motor code; one can subsequently plan an action by
anticipating the perceptual features belonging to this motor
code; and (4) representations are considered to be ‘‘inten-
tionally weighted’’ according to the task context (Fagioli,
Hommel, & Schubotz, 2007). HiTEC extends and further
specifies TEC in that it includes a task level and procedures
regarding task set implementation and action–effect
learning—cognitive control, that is, which was not the
main target of the original TEC. These additions enable
HiTEC to account for a series of key experimental findings
on the interaction between perception and action, ranging
from stimulus–response compatibility to action–effect
learning, in a unitary architecture and at a level of speci-
ficity that allows for computer simulation and concrete
empirical testing.
In earlier work, we have developed some of the modules
and principles integrated in HiTEC, and for instance shown
how basic stimulus–response translation may be used for
improving cognitive robotics (Haazebroek, van Dantzig, &
Hommel, 2011). We showed that the basic Simon effect
follows naturally from HiTECs architecture and related this
to the notion of affordances in robotics (Haazebroek, et al.
2011). In the following we provide a comprehensive and
detailed description of these and other modules, now
integrated into the HiTEC model, their interrelationships,
and their dynamics. We also present simulation results of
five different SRC paradigms. Some of these paradigms
have been modeled before using PDP models (e.g., Simon
and Stroop tasks, as discussed above), and so we do not
claim that our model is unique in accounting for these
effects in principle. What we do claim, however, is that
HiTEC provides a theoretical rationale and a mechanistic
basis explaining how and in particular why SRC occurs.
Hence, or a main goal is not efficiency or accuracy in
simulating particular outcomes but in gaining theoretical
insight through modeling. Crucially, the fifth simulation,
which targets the findings of Hommel (1993), demonstrates
HiTECs ability to account for the inversion of the Simon
effect, which has not been modeled before and clearly
shows the role of task context in action control and the
flexibility required to capture this effect. To summarize, the
focus in this article is not on predicting specific aspects of
RT distributions or optimizing particular model parame-
ters. Rather we aimed to provide a proof of principle that a
minimal set of strictly theoretically derived representa-
tional and interactive processing principles is sufficient to
characterize and explain different kinds of perception–ac-
tion interactions demonstrated in various empirical studies.
Moreover, we were interested to see whether the emer-
gence of the cognitive structure generating such interac-
tions can be made part of the modelling process; in other
words, we aimed at modelling both the generation of
cognitive representations and the processing dynamics they
engage in.
In the next section we discuss our design considerations
and present the HiTEC model. Then we present the results
of five simulations demonstrating HiTECs dynamics in
various SRC paradigms. Finally, in the discussion, we draw
a more elaborate comparison between HiTEC and existing
models focusing on the three issues discussed above.
HiTEC model
In this section we describe the HiTEC connectionist model
in full detail. We start out with discussing the general
cortical architecture of the primate brain and our general
connectionist modeling approach. Then we describe the
specific HiTEC architecture, followed by its computational
implementation. Finally, we discuss how HiTEC allows for
simulating behavioral studies and describe its general
dynamics during perception and action planning.
Levels of representation and interactivity
in the cerebral cortex
Neurons in the primate cortex appear to be organized in
numerous interconnected cortical areas. It is commonly
assumed that this organization allows the brain to encode
perceived objects in a distributed fashion. That is, different
features seem to be processed and represented across dif-
ferent cortical areas (e.g., Cowey, 1985; DeYoe & Van
Essen, 1988), coding for different perceptual modalities
(e.g., visual, auditory, tactile) and different dimensions
within each modality (e.g., visual color and shape, auditory
location and pitch). Sensory areas contain neurons that are
responsive to specific sensory features (e.g., a specific color
or a specific visual location). Areas in the motor cortex
contain neurons that code for more or less specific move-
ments (e.g., the muscle contractions that produce the
movement of the hand pressing a certain key). Higher up in
the processing stream there are cortical areas containing
neurons that are receptive to stimulation from different
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modalities. In effect, they are considered to integrate
information from different senses and modalities. Finally,
the prefrontal cortex contains neurons that are generically
involved in cognitive control of various tasks (Duncan &
Owen, 2000). These levels of representation form the basis
of the HiTEC model architecture. Crucially, cortical areas
for different levels of representation are not only inter-
connected by feedforward connections but there are also
dense neural pathways from centers of higher brain func-
tion back into perception centers (Braitenberg & Schu¨z,
1991; Young, 1995) suggesting top-down influence of
higher level areas on processing within lower level areas
(e.g., Prinz, 2006). This aspect of reciprocal connectivity
between various levels of representation is central to the
HiTEC connectionist model.
Connectionist approach
In line with the interactive activation connectionist mod-
eling approach (PDP; e.g., Rumelhart, et al., 1986), infor-
mation processing occurs through the interactions of a
large number of interconnected elements called units. Each
unit may stand for a group of neurons (i.e., localist coding).
Units are organized into higher structures representing
cortical layers. Each unit has an activation value indicating
local activity. Processing occurs by propagating activity
through the network; that is, by propagating activation
from one unit to the other, via weighted connections. When
a connection between two units is positively weighted, the
connection is excitatory and the units will increase each
other’s activation. When the connection is negatively
weighted, it is inhibitory and the units will reduce each
other’s activation. Processing starts when one or more units
receive some sort of external input. Gradually, unit acti-
vations rise and propagate through the network while
interactions between units control the flow of processing.
Some units can be designated output units. When activa-
tions of these units reach a certain threshold the network is
considered to produce the corresponding output(s).
HiTEC architecture
In line with the cortical representation principles and
interactivity discussed above, HiTEC has a multiple-layer
architecture (see Fig. 1) and recurrent interactions at mul-
tiple levels, including feedback to lower level units. In
HiTEC feedforward and feedback interactions are cooper-
ative and lateral interactions (i.e., within layers) are com-
petitive (see also Murre, Phaf & Wolters, 1992; van
Dantzig, Raffone & Hommel, 2011). The HiTEC neural
network is composed of excitatory and inhibitory neural
units in each layer. The coding functions are implemented
as excitatory units. The inhibitory units are only involved
in lateral competitive interactions; by contrast, the excita-
tory units can receive inputs from and send outputs to
associated units in other layers, yielding cooperative
interactions. Within each layer inhibitory units are acti-
vated by an associated excitatory unit and propagate inhi-
bition to the excitatory units that implement other codes in
the same layer.
We now first outline the general model architecture, and
then describe the model behavior and the computational
specification of the network units. HiTECs general archi-
tecture contains sensory layers, feature layers, a task layer
and a motor layer, as depicted in Fig. 1. Each layer
resembles a cortical circuitry and contains codes imple-
mented as excitatory connectionist network units as
described above.
Note that the connection weights can be different
(asymmetrical) for corresponding ‘forward’ and ‘back-
ward’ connections (e.g. different weights for the connec-
tion from feature codes to task codes, and the reciprocal
connection from task codes to feature codes). The different
codes (and related units) are characterized as follows.
Sensory codes
In HiTEC, different perceptual modalities (e.g., visual,
auditory, tactile, proprioceptive) are distinguished and
different dimensions within each modality (e.g., visual
color and shape, auditory location and pitch) are processed
and represented in different sensory layers. Each sensory
layer contains a number of sensory codes that are respon-
sive to specific sensory features (e.g., a specific color or a
specific location in the visual field). Sensory codes receive
external input and feedback activation from feature codes.
Crucially, the responsiveness of sensory coding units is
modulated by connected feature coding units. This is
realized by making the inputs from feature units to a sen-
sory coding unit dependent on that sensory coding unit’s
activation, which is primarily determined by its external
stimulation. This way, a sensory coding unit cannot
become highly active by mere top down input, which
would be the equivalent of a hallucination.
Motor codes
The motor layer contains motor codes, referring to more or
less specific movements (e.g., the movement of the hand
pressing a certain key or producing a verbal utterance).
Although motor codes could also be organized in multiple
layers (e.g. reflecting different body parts), in the present
version of HiTEC we consider only a single basic motor
layer with a set of motor codes. Motor codes are activated
by feature codes. When the activation level of one of the
motor coding units reaches a set response threshold, the
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motor code is assumed to be selected and executed. Sub-
sequent action effects in the environment are presented to
the sensory coding units allowing the model to learn
action–effect contingencies (see Ideomotor Learning
below). Note that our present account of motor information
represents a dramatic simplification. Movements are unli-
kely to be represented by coherent, encapsulated motor
programs (as considered by Keele, 1968) but, rather, in a
rather complex, distributed fashion (Hommel & Elsner,
2009; Wickens, Hyland, & Anson, 1994). However, this
simplification does not affect our main arguments and it
helps keeping the model and its behavior reasonably
transparent.
Feature codes
TEC’s notion of feature codes (Hommel, et al., 2001) is
captured at the feature level by codes that are connected to
and thus grounded in both sensory codes and motor codes.
Crucially, the same (distal) feature code (e.g., ‘left’) can be
connected to multiple sensory codes (e.g., ‘left proprio-
ceptive direction’ and ‘left visual shape’). Thus, informa-
tion from different sensory modalities and dimensions is
combined in one feature code representation. It is assumed
that feature codes arise from regularities in sensorimotor
experience, presumably by detecting co-occurrences of
sensory features. Since feature codes connect to both sen-
sory codes and motor codes, they can be considered com-
mon codes in the sense of Prinz (1990), subserving both
stimulus perception and response planning. When a certain
feature code is used to represent a task stimulus and this
same feature code is also used to represent a task response,
the resulting code overlap may result in compatibility
effects. Such compatibility effects are demonstrated in the
simulations discussed in the next section.
Task codes
The task layer contains generic task codes that reflect
alternative stimulus–response combinations resulting from
the task context. Different task codes reflect different
stimulus–response choice options within the task context.
Task codes connect bi-directionally to feature codes, both
the feature codes that represent stimuli and the feature
codes that represent responses, in correspondence with the
current task context. Note that task codes themselves are
Task Level
Sensory Level
Haptic
Feature Level
Motor Level
Haptic Dimension
S7 S8
Auditory
Auditory Dimension
S5 S6
Visual
Visual Dimension
S3 S4
Visual Dimension
S1 S2
Motor Codes
M1 M2
Feature Dimension
F1 F2
Feature Dimension
F3 F4
Feature Dimension
F5 F6
T1 T2
Fig. 1 General computational structure of HiTEC. Codes are
contained in layers at various levels, and are connected by excitatory
connections. Solid lines denote fixed weights, dashed lines are
connections with learned weights. Sensory codes receive modulated
excitatory input from feature codes, denoted by the open arrows. Note
that feature code–motor code associations are one-way connections
and that feature code–task code connections are non-modulated both
ways
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considered task-generic (i.e., labeled ‘T1’, ‘T2’ et cetera)
representations that are re-used across multiple tasks, in
line with findings of ad-hoc recruitment of neurons in PFC
for task-generic decision making (Duncan & Owen, 2000);
the meaning of a task code is different for each task and
completely derives from its connections with specific fea-
ture codes.
Basic model behavior
The presentation of a stimulus is simulated by feeding
external input to the appropriate (excitatory) sensory codes
relating to the various stimulus features (e.g., its location,
color, auditory tone et cetera). This results in a gradual
increase of their activation level, which is translated into
output to feature codes. Thus, activation flows gradually
from sensory codes to (stimulus related) feature codes to
task codes to (response related) feature codes to motor
codes. Once a motor code is activated strongly enough it is
assumed to lead to the execution of a motor response to the
presented stimulus. The gradual passing of activation
between codes in different layers along their connections is
iterated for a number of simulation cycles, which allows for
the simulation of reaction time (i.e., number of processing
cycles from stimulus onset to response selection). Crucially,
activation also propagates back from task codes to stimulus
related feature codes that in turn modulate the sensitivity of
sensory codes, thereby rendering an integrated processing
system with both feedforward and feedback dynamics rather
than a serial stage-like processing mechanism.
Ideomotor learning
In HiTEC, following TEC, connections between feature
codes and motor codes are not fixed but learned according
to the ideomotor principle (Hommel, 2009; James, 1890;
Lotze, 1852; Stock & Stock, 2004). This principle states
that when one executes a particular action and perceives
the resulting effects in the environment, the active motor
pattern is automatically associated to the perceptual input
representing the action’s effect. Based on these action–
effect associations, people can subsequently plan and
control a motor action by anticipating its perceptual effect.
In similar vein, learning in HiTEC is done by first
alternately activating motor codes, not unlike the explora-
tory movement behavior patterns of newborn infants
(motor babbling, see Meltzoff & Moore, 1997 for an
overview) or complete novices at a new task. When a
motor code reaches a threshold of activation, we assume
that the response is executed, resulting in perceivable
changes in the environment (action effects). In HiTEC
these action effects are perceived by stimulating the
respective sensory codes; activation is subsequently
propagated from these sensory codes towards feature codes
(cf. Elsner & Hommel, 2001). Finally, associations are
learned between these feature codes and the executed
motor code. During subsequent stimulus–response trans-
lation these associations enable activation of the appro-
priate motor action by activating the associated feature
codes. Thus, a motor action can indeed be selected by
‘anticipating its perceptual effects’ using feature codes.
Crucially these same feature codes are also used in stim-
ulus perception. This, in turn, sets the stage for compati-
bility effects which are the main focus of the current work.
Task internalization
In behavioral experiments both stimuli and responses can
have a variety of features. The task context dictates which
of these features are relevant (i.e., the features to look for
and to discriminate) and which are irrelevant. In HiTEC, a
task instruction is implemented by connecting feature
codes and task codes according to the actual task rules in
terms of stimulus features and response (i.e., action effect)
features. This procedure allows the task instruction to be
readily internalized in a principled manner. An example
task instruction ‘‘when you hear a high tone, press the left
key’’ can be implemented as connections from ‘High’ to
‘T1’ and from ‘T1’ to ‘Left’ and ‘Key’. During the subse-
quent stimulus–response translation, these connections
modulate the responsiveness of feature codes to bottom-up
input from stimulated sensory codes and through these
connections activation is propagated towards feature codes
associated to the proper motor responses in accordance
with task demands (cf., Miller & Cohen, 2001). This way,
appropriate goal oriented behavior can take place within a
certain task context.
Computational implementation
HiTEC codes are implemented as (excitatory) neural net-
work units, characterized by an activation level. These
units, which may stand for neuronal groups, receive exci-
tatory and inhibitory inputs from other units and back-
ground noise. Excitatory inputs can either be voltage
independent or voltage dependent, i.e. with a modulatory
role dependent on the voltage (‘activation’) of the receiving
unit. Indeed, cortical feedback connections are generally
voltage dependent, i.e. necessitate a sufficient level of
feedforward (stimulus related) synaptic input to be effec-
tive. In addition, the activation of the units is characterized
by a decay rate, so that in case of absence of any input the
activation will decay exponentially towards a resting level.
Units in the sensory layers can also receive an external
(stimulus related) input. Thus, on every cycle unit activa-
tions are updated according to the following equation:
1090 Psychological Research (2017) 81:1085–1109
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Aiðt þ 1Þ ¼ 1 dað Þ  AiðtÞ þ c
 Exci  1 AiðtÞð Þ þ Inh i  AiðtÞð Þ ð1Þ
In this equation, da is the activation decay rate, Ai(t) is the
activation level of unit i at time t, Exci is the sum of its
excitatory input, Inhi is its inhibitory input and c is a
scaling term. Note that both excitatory and inhibitory
inputs are scaled in a way that the unit’s activation may
take on any real value between 0.0 and 1.0. The excitatory
input is computed as follows:
Exci ¼ ExcVI i þ ExcVD i þ Ext i þ Noise i ð2Þ
Here, ExcVIi is a voltage independent (‘non-modulatory’)
input from other units in the network, which does not
depend on the activation of the receiving unit; ExcVDi is a
voltage dependent input, which is instead dependent on the
activation of the receiving units (implicitly related to the
membrane potential of receiving neurons). These different
excitatory inputs stand for different synaptic currents in
cortical networks: feedforward signaling takes place by
voltage-independent synaptic currents, and feedback sig-
naling by modulatory voltage dependent currents (e.g.,
Dehaene, Sergent, & Changeux, 2003; Raffone & Pantani,
2010; Tononi, Sporns, & Edelman, 1992). Exti is input from
external stimulation (only for units in the sensory layers) and
Noisei is a noise term. This noise term is determined by
drawing a random value from a Gaussian distribution at each
update cycle and for each unit independently. Such noise
term is introduced to capture the stochastic background of
spiking activity in the cortex (Amit & Brunel, 1997;
Grossberg & Grunewald, 1997) and for variance in network
activity across simulation trials. The voltage independent
input is obtained by calculating the weighted sum of the
outputs of all connected units (apart from units where
voltage dependent input applies, see below):
ExcVIi ¼
X
k
wþk FðAkðtÞÞ ð3Þ
Here, w? are the positive weights of the connections from
other units k to unit i. The output of a unit is a non-linear
function of its activation value, using the following func-
tion (Grossberg & Grunewald, 1997; Grossberg & Somers,
1991), with parameters na and qa:
FðAiÞ ¼ A
na
i
ðqaÞna þ Anai
ð4Þ
Crucially, the responsiveness of sensory coding units is
modulated by connected feature coding units. This is
realized by making the inputs from feature units to a sen-
sory coding unit dependent on the sensory coding unit’s
activation, which is primarily determined by its external
stimulation. This way, a sensory coding unit cannot
become highly active by mere top down input. This voltage
dependent input from feature coding units to sensory
coding units is computed using the following equation (see
Tononi, et al., 1992, for a similar computation):
ExcVDi ¼
X
k
wþk FðAkðtÞÞ
maxðAiðtÞ  ð1 daÞ  VT; 0Þ
1 VT ð5Þ
Here, da is the activation decay rate and VT is the voltage
threshold. When the sensory coding unit has a (scaled)
activation level higher than this threshold, top down input
from connected feature coding units is taken into account,
rescaled in proportion to the voltage threshold and added to
the sensory coding unit’s excitatory input. If the sensory
coding unit’s scaled activation level is lower than the
voltage threshold, this input is discarded.
Activation of units is competitive, so that coding units
within the same layer (sensory layers, feature layers, task
layer, or motor layer) inhibit each other. This is computa-
tionally realized by the involvement of ‘paired units’. Each
of the inhibitory units receive activation from its excitatory
paired unit, and propagates inhibition (i.e., their ‘outgoing’
connections are negatively weighted) to all other excitatory
units within the same layer. Such inhibition is characterized
by non-linearity, i.e. inhibitory units propagate inhibition
when they approach a level of activation. This mechanism
ensures that within a layer only one unit becomes highly
active after a certain number of simulation cycles.
Inhi is computed using the following equation:
Inhi ¼
X
k
wk FðAkðtÞÞ ð6Þ
Here, k denotes the inhibitory units belonging to any other
unit than unit i in the layer, and w- are the negative con-
nection weights. The activation of inhibitory units is
updated in a similar fashion as the excitatory units, but
their input can only be excitatory from the associated
paired unit.
Connections
Weights between sensory coding units and feature coding
units reflect long term experience and are set by hand in
HiTEC. Weights of the connections between feature coding
units and task coding are also set by hand, closely fol-
lowing the task instruction. Only the weights from feature
coding units to motor coding units are learned using
Hebbian learning.1 Specifically, at the end of each learning
1 In HiTEC, action-effect learning internalizes the regularities in co-
occurrences of motor actions with their perceptual effects. In our view
this is most simply captured by a Hebb-like unsupervised learning
rule based on co-activation, in similar vein as in the models by Zorzi
and Umilta (1995) and Herbort and Butz (2012).
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trial, all weights are updated (synchronously) according to
the following set of equations:
wjkðt þ 1Þ ¼ ð1 dwÞ  wjkðtÞ þ ActjðtÞ  ActkðtÞ
 1 wjkðtÞ
  ð7Þ
ActjðtÞ ¼ AjðtÞ  LT
1 LT if AjðtÞ[LT
ActjðtÞ ¼ 0 if AjðtÞLT
ActkðtÞ ¼ AkðtÞ  LT
1 LT if AkðtÞ[LT
ActkðtÞ ¼ 0 if AkðtÞLT
In these equations, wjk is the weight from feature coding
unit j to motor coding unit k, the dw weight decay rate
ensures that only repeated co-activations result in
stable weight learning, Actj(t) is a value based on the
activation of feature coding unit j, Actk(t) is a value based
on the activation of motor coding unit k, LT is the learning
threshold (above which the activation levels of both units
must be to engage in weight learning) and Aj(t) and Ak(-
t) are the actual activation levels at time t of feature coding
unit j and motor coding unit k, respectively. Note that we
rescale the activation of both units to their respective
proportion to the learning threshold and that the computed
connection weights are bound to vary between 0.0 and 1.0.
Also note that there are no weights from motor coding units
to feature coding units, so learning is one direction only.
The total number of codes (coding units) and connec-
tions varies with the specific instances of HiTEC used for
the different simulations. All parameters and weights
(when not learned) as used in the simulations are fixed
across all model instances. They are listed in the ‘‘Ap-
pendix’’. In general, higher decay rates make units decay
faster; lower decay rates keep units very active for a longer
period of time. Higher input values for external input and
stronger weights between units result in faster activation
propagation. Higher voltage thresholds make unit activa-
tion to a lesser extent enhanced by top down input; con-
versely, lower voltage thresholds lead to earlier and
stronger influence of top down modulation on unit activa-
tion. Stronger weights between excitatory and inhibitory
units strengthen the lateral inhibition mechanism. As a
result, they reduce the time required to settle the compe-
tition between the units within a shared layer, after which
only one unit remains strongly activated. Lower weights,
conversely, lengthen this time to convergence.
Parameters were thus chosen to enable feedforward
propagation of activation in the network to capture in an
idealized implementation neurally plausible properties of
temporal integration of signals and non-linear response
properties of excitatory and inhibitory neurons (Dehaene,
et al., 2003; Wilson & Cowan, 1972; Grossberg & Somers,
1991; Wang, 1999). The strength of voltage-dependent top-
down connections was chosen to enable their modulatory
action without causing spurious activations in the absence
of sensory input (Raffone & Pantani, 2010; Tononi, et al.,
1992). Taken together, such connection strength and tem-
poral integration and decay parameters were also chosen to
avoid the saturation of the activation level of the excitatory
units with feedforward input, so to enable sensitivity of
such activations to recurrent interactions involving multi-
ple units and top-down signals over time, in dynamic
balance with lateral (intra-layer) inhibitory interactions.
Note that our ambition for HiTEC has not been to search
for specific parameter values to optimally fit specific data
distributions. We rather set out to provide a proof of
principle as to how neurally inspired representations and
connectivity may realize stimulus–response translation
while addressing critical theoretical issues such as action
control, automaticity and coping with task context.
Simulating behavioral studies
To model a behavioral study or experimental paradigm in
HiTEC, a specific instance of the HiTEC model is con-
structed with layers, codes (coding units) and connections
that match the stimulus, response, and task characteristics
of the simulated experiment. Crucially, connections
between feature codes and task codes are set to reflect the
exact task instructions.
In each simulation there are two phases: first, action
effects are learned, reflecting the period in which the par-
ticipants get acquainted with the keypresses and their
effects, which is commonly part of behavioral experiments.
In this learning phase, we allow the model a set number of
learning trials (i.e., 20 learning trials, similar to the number
of learning trials in the various behavioral experiments) to
acquire the associations between feature codes and motor
codes. Note that when a motor code is executed, the
changes in the environment (i.e., its action effects) are
presented by supplying input to the sensory codes. Propa-
gating activation towards feature codes (i.e., for 50 cycles)
allows the model to subsequently learn the feature code–
motor code associations. Note that in behavioral experi-
ments the task context influences ideomotor learning. In
similar vein, in HiTEC, the task related representations and
connections are already in place during the learning phase.
This mere activity biases the learning process which results
in various behavioral phenomena as we will discuss in the
next section.
In the subsequent, experimental, phase the model is
presented with various stimuli by supplying input to
specific sensory coding units. Gradually, activation
spreads across all the involved coding units in the various
network layers. The trial is terminated at the selection of a
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motor response and the reaction time is determined based
on the number of cycles between stimulus onset and
response selection. This enables comparing simulated
reaction times with reaction times of human participants
in behavioral experiments, but the model also provides
insights into the dynamics of stimulus–response interac-
tions (Fig. 2).
Simulations
We simulated five key behavioral experiments on stimu-
lus–response processing using the HiTEC model. Taken
together, our five simulations demonstrate that HiTEC can
account for ideomotor learning (Elsner & Hommel, 2001),
response-effect compatibility (Kunde, Koch, & Hoffmann,
2004), stimulus–response and stimulus–stimulus compati-
bility, and the dependency of stimulus-responsive facts on
task intentions (Hommel, 1993). For each simulation we
discuss the specific results in the respective section and get
back to the general model behavior and the theoretical
implications in the Discussion.
Simulation 1: action–effect learning
Ideomotor theory assumes that action–effect acquisition
occurs on-the-fly and Elsner and Hommel (2001) were
indeed able to demonstrate that people learn action–effect
associations spontaneously. In their Experiment 1, partici-
pants responded to a visual cue stimulus by pressing a
randomly chosen left or right key. One keypress produced a
high tone and the other a low tone, which according to the
ideomotor principle should have induced bidirectional
associations between motor patterns and tone/pitch repre-
sentations. In the second phase, participants responded to
the tones that previously served as action effects by
pressing the same two keys, but now according to a specific
instruction (e.g., ‘when hearing a high tone, press the left
key’). In one (‘non-reversal’) group, the new instruction
heeded the learned relationship between tones and keys, so
that the tone that was previously produced by a particular
keypress was now signaling that keypress. In another
(‘reversal’) group, these relationships were reversed, so
that the tone that was previously produced by one keypress
was now signaling the other keypress.
If the tone-key combinations in the second phase mat-
ched the key-tone combinations from the first phase, par-
ticipants were faster than if the combinations did not
match. This suggests that in the first phase, the tones were
spontaneously associated with the keypresses that caused
them, and that the emerging associations were bidirec-
tional. Indeed, neuroscientific studies revealed that pre-
senting previously produced action effects activates the
corresponding action/motor representations (e.g., Melcher,
Weidema, Eenshuistra, Hommel, & Gruber, 2008).
To simulate Elsner and Hommel’s (2001) experiment,
we created an instance of the HiTEC model with sensory
codes for the registration of the visual cue, the auditory
pitch levels, and the haptically perceived locations of the
keys, with feature codes for the square shape, the pitch
levels, the locations, and the ‘Sound’ and ‘Key’ in general,2
and with motor codes for the two keypressing actions, as
illustrated in Fig. 3. Simulation of the study occurred in
two distinct phases: the learning phase and the experi-
mental phase.
During the learning phase motor patterns ‘M1’ and ‘M2’
were activated alternately and their respective action
effects were presented to the model. As a result, associa-
tions were learned between the motor codes and the active
feature codes.
Figure 4a shows a learning trial in which the motor code
‘M1’ was activated. This activation led to the simultaneous
perception of both a keypress and an auditory tone,
resulting in a relatively strong activation of some of the
feature codes, including ‘Left’ and ‘Low’. The regularity in
combinations of motor actions and their perceivable effects
resulted in systematic co-activation of specific motor codes
and feature codes. As a consequence, specific motor code–
feature code connections were strengthened over time, as is
illustrated by Fig. 4b.
In the second phase, we let the model instance respond
to auditory stimuli with high or low pitch. Note that the
change of task (i.e., ‘press a random key’ vs. ‘respond
selectively to auditory tones’) was reflected in the change
in connections between feature codes and task codes only
as illustrated in Fig. 5. The remainder of the model was
kept unchanged, most notably the just learned associations
between feature codes and motor codes. For this second
phase, two copy instances of the model were to respond to
stimuli according to two different instructions: the ‘non-
reversal’ model instance copy was to respond to the
learning-compatible stimuli (i.e., what had been the effect
on an action now became the stimulus signaling this
action), whereas the ‘reversal’ model instance was to
respond to auditory tones with responses that previously
produced the alternative tone.
In this second phase, in both model instances, stimulus
tones were presented by stimulating auditory sensory
codes. Activation subsequently flowed from these sensory
codes towards ‘Pitch’ feature codes, task codes and to the
‘Location’ feature codes and the ‘Key’ feature code. Also,
activation flowed through the learned associations towards
2 For the sake of simplicity, these feature codes are taken to represent
all object characteristics that are not represented by other, specific
feature codes, such as its color or location.
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the motor codes. Depending on the stimulus tone, either
one or the other motor code reached the response threshold
and simulation was terminated. In both conditions, acti-
vation flowed from pitch feature codes to task codes to
location feature codes, in accord with the task instruction.
Simultaneously, however, activation also flowed directly
from pitch feature codes to motor codes, along the just
acquired action–effect connections. Now, crucially, in the
‘non-reversal’ condition, these connections facilitated
processing, whereas these same connections caused inter-
ference in the ‘reversal’ condition. As a consequence, in
line with the behavioral findings of Elsner and Hommel
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Fig. 2 An illustration of the
model dynamics: stimulus-
induced activation propagates
from sensory to feature codes,
involving task and motor codes.
The figure shows incongruent
trial in the Simon task (see
below for more details). The
high-pitched, right stimulus tone
feeds into the sensory codes
‘Auditory high’ and ‘Auditory
right’ and activation propagates
towards feature codes. Due to
prior action–effect learning,
feature code ‘Right’ eventually
propagates activation to motor
code ‘M2’, while activation also
propagates from the ‘High’
feature code towards the task
codes, resulting in a more
strongly activated ‘T1’ and less
strongly activated ‘T2’. ‘T1’
further propagates activation
towards feature code ‘Left’,
whose activation level
eventually exceeds the level of
‘Right’. At the same time
activation propagates from
‘Right’ to the associated motor
code ‘M1’, which eventually
exceeds the activation level of
‘M2’ and reaches the response
threshold. At that point, feature
codes ‘Left’ and ‘Key’ are also
highly activated. Note that these
feature codes resemble the
action effect of the produced
response
1094 Psychological Research (2017) 81:1085–1109
123
(2001) the model instance in the non-reversal condition
reached the response threshold (29.3 cycles on average)
faster3 than the instance in the reversal condition (38.5
cycles on average). This simulation demonstrates how
HiTECs representations and basic processing principles
readily give rise to the observed empirical results demon-
strated by Elsner and Hommel (2001).
Simulation 2: action planning
The observations of Elsner and Hommel (2001) confirm the
claim from ideomotor theory that action–effect associations
are automatically acquired as demonstrated in Simulation 1.
However, this does not yet speak to the further-reaching
claim of ideomotor theory that action effects play an
important role in the planning of intentional actions. Evi-
dence supporting that claim was provided by Kunde, et al.
(2004), who showed that choice performance is affected by
Task Level
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Motor Level
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Visual
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Motor Codes
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Shape
Square
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Other
Sound Key
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Left Right
Fig. 3 Specific HiTEC model instance for learning trials in Simu-
lation 1. Connections (dashed lines) between feature codes and motor
codes were learned. Note that in principle any feature code can be
connected to any motor code. However, only some of these possible
connections actually become (strongly) weighted as a result of the
perceived regularities in action effects
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Fig. 4 Code activation and connection weight time courses in
learning trials of Simulation 1. a Activation of feature codes during
learning trials as a consequence of perceiving the action effects of the
activated motor code. b Connections between motor codes and feature
codes got gradually stronger over multiple learning trials. Note that
feature codes ‘Key’ and ‘Sound’ are omitted from both figures for the
sake of clarity
3 t(38) = 53.42, p\ 0.001.
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the compatibility between haptic action effects of the
responses proper and novel (auditory) action effects. In their
experiment, for one group of participants, responses were
followed by a compatible action effect; the loudness of the
tone matched the response force (e.g., a loud tone appeared
after a forceful key press). In the other group of participants
the relationship between actions and action effects was
incompatible (e.g., a soft tone appeared after a forceful key
press). In both groups, subjects had to respond to a visual
cue stimulus by pressing the key softly or forcefully. It was
found that the group with action-compatible action effects
was faster on average than the group with incompatible
action effects. Given that the tones did not appear before the
responses were executed, this observation suggests that the
novel, just acquired action effects were anticipated and
considered in the response-selection process.
This effect of response-effect compatibility was simu-
lated in HiTEC. As shown in Fig. 6, the model instance
contained sensory codes for the visual colors, auditory
intensities and haptic intensities. Motor codes ‘M1’ and
‘M2’ represented forceful and soft keypresses, respectively.
Importantly, to the model these motor codes were not
intrinsically forceful or soft but were associated with (and
acquired their meaning from) these perceptual character-
istics only through learning.
In the HiTEC simulation, this learning was modeled
explicitly during a brief learning phase. In this learning
phase, motor codes were activated alternately and the
model was presented with the appropriate action effects
(i.e., haptic intensity and auditory intensity). Crucially, two
copy instances of the model received two different action
effects, in accord with the two groups in the empirical
study: one instance received consistent action effects (e.g.,
a forceful keypress with a loud tone); the other instance
received inconsistent action effects (e.g., a forceful key-
press with a soft tone). As a consequence, in the model
instance in the consistent condition, the active auditory and
haptic sensory codes activated the same intensity feature
code every time an action effect was presented. This
resulted in steady weight increase of motor code–intensity
feature code associations. Conversely, in the inconsistent
condition, the active auditory and haptic sensory codes
activated different intensity feature codes every time an
action effect was presented. Indeed, a forceful keypress
would coincide with a soft tone; and a weak keypress with
a loud tone. This resulted in only a mild weight increase of
motor code–intensity feature code associations. More
specifically, because the task instruction includes pressing
keys, the key feature code was connected to the task codes
(as depicted in Fig. 6), and because the key feature code
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Fig. 5 Specific HiTEC model for experimental trials in Simulation 1. Note that only the feature code–task code connections were adapted as
compared to Fig. 3, reflecting a new task instruction with the same model instance
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was connected to the haptic sensory codes, these haptic
sensory codes, when activated, automatically received
voltage dependent input from the key feature code. This
made them slightly more active than the auditory intensity
sensory codes which did not receive such enhancement. As
a result the intensity feature code that was activated by the
haptic sensory code was also slightly more active than the
intensity feature code that was activated by the auditory
intensity sensory code, during action–effect learning. As
this was the case for every action–effect learning trial, the
haptic intensity became the major determinant in the
weight learning of connections between ‘Intensity’ feature
codes and the motor codes. In more general terms, since the
task instruction was already internalized before presenting
the learning trials, it biased the learning of connections
between feature codes and motor codes. Note that in the
simulations discussed in the current work we allow a fixed
number of 20 trials of action–effect learning, similar to the
number of learning trials in the various behavioral exper-
iments. This, however, does not mean that compatibility
effects would vanish when the model would be given
unlimited number of trials. As shown in Fig. 4b, the
weights stabilize after a number of trials due to the decay
rate in weight learning. Moreover, action–effect learning
does not depend on imperative stimuli: motor codes are
activated and resulting action effects are presented to the
model enabling action–effect learning (cf., Herbort & Butz,
2012).
During the actual experimental trials, visual stimuli
were presented. This resulted in activation propagation
from the visual stimulus codes to the color feature codes to
the task codes towards the intensity feature codes and
finally the motor codes. Crucially, responding to stimuli
required the model to propagate activation along the just
acquired intensity feature code–motor code connections.
Because the strength of these connections differed for the
two different conditions, as a result of task-modulated
action–effect learning described above, the model instances
differed in their simulated response time. The ‘consistent’
model instance responded faster4 (24.0 cycles on average)
than the inconsistent model instance (26.0 cycles on
average), in line with the empirical data obtained by
Kunde, et al. (2004). This simulation demonstrates how
HiTEC uses acquired action–effect connections to plan
actions and, therefore, shows response-effect compatibility
effects. In the current simulation the model is required to
respond to stimuli: visual stimuli are presented to the
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Fig. 6 Specific HiTEC model instance for Simulation 2, including feature codes for all stimulus and response features
4 t(38) = 39.00, p\ 0.001. Since we opted for fixed parameters and
weights (when not learned) across instances, the model’s dynamics
are slightly different due to the varying number of codes and
connections between the instances. In Simulation 2 this results in a
rather small effect size.
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stimuli and the model activates action effects that are
associated with the motor codes. It is conceivable, how-
ever, that in a free-choice task (e.g., Pfister & Kunde, 2013)
the model would also produce a ‘response’ by anticipating
action effects. Varying consistency within action–effect
associations would then also lead to compatibility effects,
as the (in)consistency does not depend on the stimulus but
on the ‘internal’ consistency within the action effect (see
Pfirster & Kunde, 2013 for a discussion on interpretations
in terms of response-effect or effect-effect consistency).
Simulation 3: Simon effect
A key finding for understanding the interaction between
perception and action is the Simon effect. Simon and
Rudell (1967) showed that people respond faster to stimuli
if the location of the stimulus is compatible with (corre-
sponds to) the response location, even when stimulus
location is not task relevant. In the standard Simon task,
stimuli with a non-spatial stimulus feature (e.g., auditory
pitch) are presented at different locations (e.g., left or
right). Participants are instructed to respond to the non-
spatial feature by giving a spatially defined response (e.g.,
pressing a left or right key). Even though the location of the
stimulus is not relevant for this task, performance is
facilitated when the chosen response corresponds spatially
to the stimulus location.
The Simon effect was modeled in HiTEC, as shown in
Fig. 7, using sensory codes for auditory pitch, auditory
locations and haptic locations, feature codes for pitch,
location and for ‘Key’ and finally two motor codes, ‘M1’
and ‘M2’, representing pressing the left and the right key.
During the learning phase, ‘M1’ and ‘M2’ were activated
alternately and their respective action effects were pre-
sented to the model. As a result, associations were learned
selectively between the motor codes and the ‘Left’ and
‘Right’ feature codes.
In the experimental trials, tones were presented and
responded to by propagating activation from sensory codes
to pitch feature codes to task codes and to location feature
codes and finally motor codes. Crucially, the ‘Left’ and
‘Right’ feature codes were also activated when the tone
stimulus was presented on the left or right yielding dif-
ferent dynamics when the tone location coincided (com-
patible trial) with the key location of the anticipated
response than when the tone was on the opposite side (non-
compatible trial) as illustrated in Fig. 8.
Essentially, in the compatible condition, the stimulus
location already activated the ‘correct’ spatial feature code
and thereby sped up response selection. Conversely, in the
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Fig. 7 Specific HiTEC model instance for Simulation 3, including feature codes for stimulus pitch and location. Note that location feature codes
were used for encoding both stimulus location and response location
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incompatible condition, stimulus location activated the
‘wrong’ spatial feature code, which also already activated
the ‘wrong’ motor code. Meanwhile, however, the stimulus
pitch was translated—through the task codes—into the
correct spatial feature codes and the correct motor code.
This latter pathway overcame the head start due to the
overlap-pathway, but the code overlap did slow down the
overall translation as reflected in the results. In the com-
patible condition the HiTEC model was faster5 (19 cycles
on average) than in the non-compatible condition (38.5
cycles on average) with the neutral condition falling in
between (24.5 cycles on average), which is in line with the
empirical findings by Simon and Rudell (1967). This
simulation demonstrates that implementing a Simon task in
HiTEC using common feature codes for stimuli and
responses automatically yields the observed compatibility
effect.
Simulation 4: Stroop effect
As we do not differentiate between perceptual and action
stages, one could argue that stimulus–response compati-
bility and stimulus–stimulus compatibility would need to
work similarly in HiTEC. Stroop (1935) showed that if
people are instructed to name the ink color of color words,
they are slower if the word (e.g., ‘‘blue’’) appears in an
incompatible ink color (e.g., red). This compatibility effect
is dramatically reduced if non-verbal responses are
required (MacLeod, 1991), suggesting that the task-irrele-
vant words interfere (at least partly) with verbally naming
the colors. Note that this interpretation of the Stroop effect
bears a strong resemblance to the Simon effect as the effect
is now attributed to incompatibility between a stimulus
feature (ink color) and a response feature (verbal sound)
(Fig. 9).
In HiTEC the Stroop effect is simulated along the
same lines as the Simon effect in Simulation 3. In
similar vein, during the learning trials, the model alter-
nately executed ‘M1’ and ‘M2’, reflecting the ‘physical’
pronunciation of the respective words. The model was
subsequently presented with the auditory feedback (i.e.,
reflecting the perception of this pronunciation) and
associations were learned between motor codes and
feature codes. During experimental trials, naming ink
color of compatible color words benefitted from facili-
tation whereas naming the color of incompatible color
words suffered from interference. Indeed, responses were
faster6 in the compatible condition (19 cycles on aver-
age) and slower (38.5 cycles on average) in the incom-
patible condition, with the neutral condition falling in
between (24.5 cycles on average). This simulation
demonstrates that by treating stimulus features and
response features similarly, some cases of stimulus-
stimulus compatibility may be accounted for using the
exact same logic (and processing principles) as for
stimulus–response compatibility. In HiTEC, this results
in identical simulations.
Simulation 5: inverting the Simon effect
Hommel (1993) demonstrated that the Simon effect as
described in Simulation 3 can be ‘inverted’ by changing
the task instruction only. In this study participants
responded with left or right keypresses to the high vs. low
pitch of tones which were presented left or right. When a
key was pressed a flash light was presented on the
opposite side of the keypress. One group was instructed to
‘‘press the left/right key’’ in response to the low/high
pitch of the tone, whereas another group was instructed to
‘‘flash the right/left light’’ in response to the low/high
pitch. In other words, all participants carried out exactly
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Fig. 8 Time courses of feature code and motor code activations in
the experimental trials of Simulation 3. a Activations during a
compatible trial. Here ‘M1’ reached response threshold in 19 cycles.
b Dynamics in a non-compatible trial. Here ‘M1’ reached threshold in
41 cycles. Note that activations of other feature codes, task codes and
sensory codes are omitted for sake of clarity
5 F(2,56) = 11,230.03, p\ 0.001. 6 F(2,56) = 11,230.03, p\ 0.001.
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the same movements in response to the same stimuli, but
one group did that ‘‘in order to press the keys’’ while the
other did it ‘‘in order to flash the lights’’. This seemingly
minor manipulation had a major impact on the Simon
effect. Whereas the Key group showed a standard Simon
effect with faster responses for spatial correspondence
between tones and keys, the Light group showed the
opposite effect: faster responses for spatial correspon-
dence between tones and lights. This observation
demonstrates the crucial role of task instruction in stim-
ulus and response coding and, more generally, in per-
ception and action planning.
The empirical study was simulated in HiTEC using
two instances of the model. One instance was configured
according to the Key instruction, the other to the Light
instruction. The latter condition is depicted in Fig. 10.
Note that the difference in task instructions was reflected
in the task connections alone. Crucially, in the ‘Key’
model instance the mere connections between ‘Key’ and
the task codes enhanced the processing of haptic loca-
tions. In contrast, in the ‘Light’ model instance, the
connections between ‘Light’ and the task codes enhanced
visual locations. This specific wiring biased the action–
effect learning and the direction of the compatibility
effect during subsequent experimental trials. The results7
are illustrated in Fig. 11. Here, the ‘Key’ model instance
showed fastest responses in the congruent stimulus-key
condition (21.5 cycles on average), intermediate response
time in the neutral condition (25.7 cycles on average), and
slowest responses in the incongruent stimulus-key condi-
tion (39.4 cycles on average). In contrast, for the ‘Light’
model instance these results were inverted: fastest
responses in the incongruent stimulus-key condition (21.0
cycles on average), intermediate response time in the
neutral condition (25.7 cycles on average), and slowest
responses in the congruent stimulus-key condition (38.3
cycles on average). Together these results yield a pattern
similar to the empirical findings reported by Hommel
(1993). Note that in the behavioral study additional fac-
tors were at play that further influenced the results
yielding a non-symmetrical pattern. These factors include
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Fig. 9 Specific HiTEC model instance for Simulation 4, including
feature codes for stimulus colors and words. Crucially, word feature
codes were used for encoding both stimuli (i.e., the color words) and
responses (i.e., the words to name the ink color). Connections
between word feature codes and motor codes were learned during
learning trials (i.e., pronouncing the words). Note that this model
structure is in essence identical to the structure of the model used for
Simulation 3
7 Analysis of variance shows a significant interaction effect between
‘Key’ vs ‘Light’ and stimulus-key congruency on response time
(F(2,114) = 489.17, p\ 0.001). Specific analysis of Key model trials
shows a significant main effect for stimulus-key congruency
(F(2,57) = 165.93, p\ 0.001). Also, the specific analysis of Light
model trials shows a significant main effect for stimulus-key
congruency (F(2,57) = 767.62, p\ 0.001).
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possible individual problems with an unfamiliar instruc-
tion, but more importantly another difference between key
and light conditions: in the key condition not only the
goal (key location) was compatible or incompatible with
the stimulus, but also the anatomical location (i.e., hand).
In the light condition, only the goal (light location) was
compatible or incompatible with the stimulus. This may
have led to different patterns in both reaction times and
error rates (see Hommel, 1993 for a detailed discussion).
The notion of anatomical location is not modeled in the
current simulation, hence to the model the key and light
conditions are completely symmetrical whereas this is not
the case for human participants. Overall, this simulation
demonstrates that the basic principles of HiTEC allow a
task to be implemented in a way that stimuli and
responses are encoded flexibly and even ‘automatic’
aspects of stimulus–response translation can be modulated
by the task.
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Fig. 10 Specific HiTEC model instance for Simulation 5. Shown is the model instance for the Light condition. The Key condition differed only
in the connections from ‘T1’ and ‘T2’ to ‘Key’ instead of ‘Light’. Connections between feature codes and motor codes (dashed) are learned
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Discussion
In HiTEC the link between perception and action involves
representations on multiple levels in a connectionist net-
work, through the interplay of feedforward and feedback
connections. Stimuli are presented by feeding external
input to sensory codes. Responses are considered to exe-
cute when a motor code reaches the activation threshold.
Stimuli are translated into responses via an interactive
process in the network, with gradual feedforward and
feedback propagation of activation in it. Rather than a
sequential stepwise process from sensory codes through
intermediate representations to response codes, all repre-
sentations at all levels cooperate and compete and together
converge to a response outcome. Crucially, representations
at higher levels modulate representations at lower levels.
This allows both for direct interaction between perception
and action representations and modulation by the task
context. Although the rather simple HiTEC model is not
intended as a detailed neuroscientific model, it might be
worth noting that its components, as well as their con-
nectivity, do map in a gross way onto specific neural sys-
tems. The network architecture follows the same general
form as more neurobiologically oriented models of visual
attention and object selection do (e.g., Deco & Rolls,
2004).
More specifically, our approach is in line with the inte-
grated competition hypothesis (Duncan, Humphreys, &
Ward, 1997). This hypothesis proposes that visual attention
results from competition in multiple brain systems and rests on
the three following principles. First, different objects are
considered to compete for activation within multiple brain
systems. Second, although this competition takes place in
multiple brain systems, it is integrated between these systems
in such a way that units responding to the same object in
different brain systems support each other’s activity, whereas
units responding to different objects compete. Finally, com-
petition is considered to be directed on the basis of relevant
object properties based on the current task demands. Duncan,
et al. (1997) suggest top-down neural priming as a possible
control mechanism. HiTEC could be considered both a gen-
eralization and specification of this hypothesis. Due to the
common coding nature of feature codes, not only visual
attention but also action anticipation (and thus action control)
are considered to compete for activation, hence generalizing
the scope of the integrated competition account. HiTEC fur-
ther specifies a possible method of directing this competition
using task set connections rather than priming. Moreover,
HiTEC explicitly addresses how the task instruction could
implement such a task set and how task instruction could
influence both perception and action planning.
Our notion of interactive processing with mutual influ-
ences among multiple subsystems is shared by the early
selective action model of Ward (1999), who proposes that
action plans may bias selective perceptual processing
towards relevant objects (see Hommel, 2010). Like in
HiTEC, selected representations receive external input and
activation gradually spreads among various units coding
through the reciprocal connections converging to a selected
object and action. Task context is encoded by priming the
units that represent the task-relevant object and/or action
feature, which biases the competition between representa-
tions accordingly. Like HiTEC, and unlike most other
perception–action models, the selective action model can
thus account for effects of action planning on perception
and attention (e.g., Wykowska, Schubo¨, & Hommel, 2009).
The most important difference between Ward’s (1999)
model and HiTEC concerns the model architecture: Given
the emphasis on reaching and grasping, Ward distinguishes
explicitly between a ventral ‘what’ and a dorsal ‘where’
pathway (Milner & Goodale, 1995). While this distinction
can (and eventually should) be integrated with HiTEC
(Hommel, 2010), TEC and HiTEC are mainly concerned
with the ‘‘ventral’’ branch of this processing structure,
hence, with perception–action interactions at a common
coding level of feature representations. Another major
difference between the models refers to how a task is
internalized. In Ward’s model, a single task rule (e.g., ‘grab
the red object’) is set by supplying additional external input
to a selection of codes (e.g., ‘red’ and ‘grab’) which then
biases the processing of the stimulus input. That is, stim-
ulus presentation and task instruction occur simultaneously
and use the same mechanism of applying external input. In
HiTEC, task context is internalized instead by intercon-
necting feature codes and generic task codes based on the
task instruction. Then, these connections automatically
modulate the propagation of activation resulting from
stimulus presentation. Crucially, this allows HiTEC to
internalize multiple task rules at the same time that com-
pete during subsequent stimulus–response translation
effectively allowing for (minimalistic) decision making,
whereas Ward’s model is focused on executing one specific
task (e.g., ‘grab the red object’) at a time depending on the
codes that receive additional input bias during stimulus
processing. Indeed, Ward states that these external inputs
are meant to result from decisions that are made outside the
scope of this model, which is much in line with Cohen,
et al. (1990). The Ward model, however, does allow for
selective attention for targets among distractors in the
stimulus display, an aspect of attention that HiTEC cur-
rently lacks. Finally, although Ward, in accord with our
approach, aimed at addressing the interaction between
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perception and action, his model assumes the implications
for action of a given object by fixed connections between
given object features (e.g., vertical object orientation) and
given, rather specific, actions (e.g., vertical grasp). This
connection between perception and action planning is
addressed more generically and more explicitly in HiTEC
using the notion of common codes and ideomotor learning.
Accordingly, although HiTEC shares some core
assumptions with the Selective Action Model, we consider
the former as much broader than the latter, which also
holds for the recent extension of the selective action model
by Botvinick, Buxbaum, Bylsma, and Jax (2009). More-
over, none of these two versions of the selective action
model addresses empirical findings of automaticity (i.e.,
stimulus–response compatibility), which is a major draw-
back for models targeting the interaction between percep-
tion and action. Let us now turn to the three major
questions that have guided our study: how can actions
acquire situation-specific meanings, how does automatic
stimulus–response translation emerge, and how does task
context modulate stimulus–response processing?
Meaning of action
Action control in HiTEC is based on the ideomotor prin-
ciple, which addresses both the acquisition of action–effect
associations and the use of these associations in action
planning. Simulation 1 addresses how novel action-con-
tingent perceivable effects are (spontaneously) associated
to the actions that yield these effects. Simulation 2
demonstrates how the (internal) consistency of these
effects influences the representations of these effects. As
action–effect learning depends on the activation of both
motor codes and feature codes, the consistency of feature
code activation has consequences for the resulting associ-
ation strengths. And because these associations have a
crucial role in planning actions in response to stimuli,
subsequent stimulus–response translation is influenced by
the strengths of these associations. As a result, action
planning takes the contextual meaning (e.g., consistency
among action effect features) of motor actions into account
as represented in the acquired action–effect associations.
Importantly, Simulation 1 demonstrates that in HiTEC
novel action effects become (at the distal level) associated
to motor codes. The connection between sensory and fea-
ture code is the result of (earlier) grounding processes; the
connection between motor code and feature code results
from action–effect learning as demonstrated in both sim-
ulations. That is, execution of a motor code results in
changes in the environment that are ‘picked up’ by sensory
codes and distally represented by feature codes. Multiple
encounters of this sensorimotor co-occurrence is consid-
ered to strengthen the connection between motor codes and
feature codes. Moreover, different sensory codes may
activate the same feature code. This is the case in Simu-
lation 2 where both auditory and haptic sensory codes
project to the same distal feature codes that code for ‘in-
tensity’. Consistent action effects activate these feature
codes more strongly and, therefore, lead to stronger action–
effect associations as compared to inconsistent action
effects, as suggested by the findings of Kunde and col-
leagues addressed in Simulation 2. Crucially, in the HiTEC
simulation of this experiment, the auditory and haptic
sensory codes receive equal external stimulation upon
perceiving the action effect. It is due to the top down
modulation of the task-feature connections with the ‘key’
code that the haptic sensations are enhanced and thus play a
dominant role in representing the action effect as compared
to the auditory sensations. It is this task set modulation of
action effect representation (and its influence on action–
effect learning and subsequent stimulus–response transla-
tion) that creates situation-specific meanings of actions.
Note that this flexibility is only possible because of the
distinction that HiTEC makes between motor codes (which
are unaffected by task set) and action–effect codes (which
are affected by task set). To appreciate this point, consider
the study by Wallace (1971). In one of his conditions, the
participant’s left and right hands were held in parallel (i.e.,
placed on the spatially corresponding left and right keys)
but they were crossed in another condition. In both con-
ditions, left stimuli facilitated responses with the left key
and right stimuli facilitated responses with the right key,
irrespective of which hand was used to operate the key. In
other words, what mattered for stimulus–response com-
patibility was the spatial relationship between stimuli and
hand locations, but not the relationship between stimuli and
particular hands. Considering that the motor program
driving the keypress response of a particular hand is largely
the same whether the hand is located on the left or right
side of one’s body, it is impossible to model such a finding
with a model that connects stimulus to motor codes—as the
compatibility model suggested by Zorzi and Umilta (1995)
and Kornblum, et al. (1990, 1999). Rather, stimulus codes
must be related to some abstract action code that can be
flexibly related to particular motor outputs (Wallace,
1971), exactly as suggested by HiTEC. It is this action or
action–effect code, rather than motor codes, that intentional
agents use to control their intentional actions—by ‘‘antic-
ipating the intended action effects’’, as ideomotor theory
suggests. Given that they anticipate only the intended parts
of all the action effects that a given action has been learned
to produce, ideomotor action control can be considered to
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be a process comprising of attentional selection. If, for
instance, a particular motor program (like pressing a key) is
carried out by one’s right-hand located on the left side, the
corresponding motor code is associated with both a ‘‘Left’’
code representing the hand’s location and a ‘‘Right’’ code
representing its anatomical identity. What matters in the
task like that used by Wallace (1971) is the location, agents
would ‘‘attend’’ and ‘‘intentionally weigh’’ the ‘‘Left’’ code
more/higher than the ‘‘Right’’ code, which effectively
renders the action ‘‘Left’’—a situation-specific meaning.
This first version of HiTEC considers action–effect
learning as a rather reactive/passive process. Interestingly,
the basic principle of picking up sensorimotor (or action-
perception) contingencies is consistent with the sensori-
motor theory of O’Regan and Noe¨ (2001). In their
approach, perceiving is a way of acting, actively exploring
the environment rather than merely registering and repre-
senting the outside world, so that the process of active
seeing (which includes the movement of body, head, and
eyes) is directly producing the very changes that are picked
up by visual receptors. The active perceiver/actor, so
O’Regan and Noe¨ argue, would need to learn how his/her
own actions influence perceptions (sensorimotor contin-
gencies) and perceiving the world builds on this knowl-
edge. Although HiTEC does not model learning such
contingencies per se, it does share the idea of acquiring
grounded representations of sensorimotor regularities in
interactions with the world and using those representations
both for perception (as suggested in the sensorimotor the-
ory) and actions, which indeed lead to perception, both in
the sensorimotor account and in HiTEC.
One possibility to endow HiTEC with the more active
learning strategy that O’Regan and Noe¨ suggest is by
means of action monitoring. The anticipated action effects
are a trigger for action selection, but also form an expec-
tation of the perceptual outcome of the action. Differences
between this expectation and reality lead to adjusting the
action on a lower sensorimotor level than is currently
modeled in HiTEC. What matters now, is that the feature
codes are interacting with the sensory codes, making sure
that the generated perception is within the set parameters,
as determined by the expected action outcome. If this is not
(well enough) the case, the action should be adjusted.
However, when a discrepancy of this expectation drasti-
cally exceeds ‘adjustment thresholds’, it may actually
trigger action effect learning (phase 1). Apparently, the
action–effect associations were unable to deliver an apt
expectation of the actual outcome. Thus, anticipating the
desired outcome falsely led to the execution of this action.
This may trigger the system to modify these associations,
so that the motor codes become associated with the correct
action effect features. Such a monitoring system could
work along the lines of (Botvinick, Braver, Barch, Carter,
& Cohen, 2001). The experience of response conflict and/
or of negative feedback might strengthen the activation
state of goal codes and their impact on stimulus–response
processing, which would tend to prevent errors in the future
(van Steenbergen, Band, & Hommel, 2009).
Furthermore, anticipation based action control (see also
Butz & Pezzulo, 2008; Haazebroek & Hommel, 2009) is
consistent with basic concepts in research on human
motor control (e.g., Wolpert & Ghahramani, 2000). Here,
the motor system is considered to form a loop in which
motor commands lead to muscle contractions which cause
sensory feedback, which in turn influences future motor
commands. Neural circuits are considered to form internal
models that control motor action: forward models are
considered to model the causal relationship between
actions and their consequences and inverse models
determine the motor command required to achieve the
desired outcome. These concepts clearly resonate with the
role of action–effect associations in the HiTEC model.
Also, our approach is much in line with the work by
Herbort and Butz (2012) who used a computational model
to test action–effect learning in a similar way. Their
model consists of action codes and effect codes only, and
their simulations focused on various conditions of actions
and effects (e.g., number of actions and effects, noise in
effect representations, actions executed in parallel, dif-
ferent actions with the same effects, sequences of actions
et cetera). In contrast, HiTEC also addresses stimulus
perception and how stimulus perception and action plan-
ning using common codes may result in compatibility
effects.
Automaticity
Phenomena of stimulus–response compatibility are com-
monly considered to reflect the parallel processing of task-
relevant information (such as color in a Stroop task) and
task-irrelevant information (such as word meaning in a
Stroop task). Accordingly, models of such phenomena
distinguish between an intentional route, which processes
instructed, task-relevant information, and an automatic
route, which processes irrelevant information (e.g., Cohen,
et al., 1990; Kornblum, et al., 1990, 1999; Zorzi & Umilta,
1995). The degree to which automatic processing occurs is
assumed to depend on the strength of associations between
stimulus and response codes, which either is assumed as a
not further explained given (Kornblum, et al., 1990, 1999;
Zorzi & Umilta, 1995) or attributed to stimulus–response
learning.
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HiTEC can also be construed as a dual-route model that
processes relevant and irrelevant information in parallel,
and the degree to which that occurs also depends on
learning. And yet, the logic underlying the processing of
irrelevant information is different and the degree to which
that occurs is entirely independent of stimulus–response
learning. First, ‘‘automatic’’ processing of actually task-
irrelevant information occurs if and because there is feature
overlap between stimulus and response representations.
Although some other models have considered feature
overlap as an important criterion (Kornblum, et al.,
1990, 1999), they have failed to explain how this overlap
translates into automatic processing—they simply assume
that it does.
HiTEC provides a straightforward theoretical reason: if
the stimulus event feature-overlaps with an action event,
their representations are partially identical, which means
that activating one necessarily activates the other to some
degree. Second, the intentional-weighting principle of TEC
and HiTEC implies that feature overlap can render task-
irrelevant feature dimensions task-relevant. Take the
Simon task: the emphasis of task instructions on response
location will induce the intentional weighting of the loca-
tion dimension. Given that HiTEC does not distinguish
between stimulus location and response location, this
means that increasing the weight of the response-location
dimension necessarily implies higher weights on stimulus
location. Accordingly, HiTEC considers automaticity a
byproduct of intentional task preparation (Hommel, 2000).
Note that this automaticity does not rely on stimulus–re-
sponse learning (and can thus occur for entirely novel
stimulus–response combinations) but on action–effect
learning, through which actions acquire their features.
This logic is illustrated in Simulation 3, where stimulus–
response compatibility/automaticity follows from the fact
that responses are coded in terms of their spatial perceptual
consequences, due to ideomotor learning. In similar vein,
in Simulation 4, the task-irrelevant word feature only has
influence because the response is coded in terms of these
features (a result from action–effect learning). If the
response would not be verbally defined (e.g., but in terms
of key presses, which in HiTEC would be spatially repre-
sented) the compatibility effect is indeed dramatically
reduced or eliminated, especially in tasks preventing
internal naming (MacLeod, 1991).
Task demands
In line with TECs general ‘intentional weighting’ principle
(Memelink & Hommel, 2013), HiTEC explicitly addresses
how task instructions are implemented in terms of
representations and connections, and how they affect sub-
sequent processing. The model is initially as task ignorant
as humans are, until it ‘receives the task instruction’. A task
instruction is implemented by connecting feature codes and
task codes following the actual task rules in terms of
stimulus features and response (i.e., action effect) features.
Here, we hypothesize that feature codes can be accessed by
means of verbal labels and that receiving a task instruction
can activate these feature codes and connect them to gen-
eric task codes (i.e., some sort of internal simulation of the
translation from stimulus features to response features).
This allows the task instruction to be readily internalized as
connections from feature codes to task codes to feature
codes. As an example, the instruction ‘‘when you hear a
high tone, press the left key’’ (taken from Simulation 5)
would be implemented as connections from ‘High’ to ‘T1’
and from ‘T1’ to ‘Left’ and ‘Key’. These connections
subsequently enable the model to produce stimulus–re-
sponse translations in accordance with task demands. Note
that apart from this instruction-based wiring we do not
assume any other type of task-specific addition to the
model (i.e., no additional ‘task inputs’ or biases during
stimulus–response translation as is the case in the model of
Cohen, et al., 1990).
These feature code–task code connections have two
main consequences for subsequent processing: (1) they
propagate activation from stimulus features towards
response features that in turn excite motor codes and (2)
they top down modulate lower level processing due to their
recurrent nature. Arguably, this essentially constitutes ‘at-
tention’: sensory codes that are connected to feature codes
are enhanced, sensory codes that are not connected (i.e.,
stimulated by ‘the other’ elements in the scene) are not
enhanced. Moreover, relative higher activation of feature
codes also results in relative stronger enhancement of
sensory codes. This enhancement of lower level represen-
tations is crucial both in stimulus–response translation (i.e.,
responding to a stimulus is an integrated process) and
during action–effect learning where it focuses attention on
the relevant action effect features.
Moreover, as stimuli and responses are both defined in
terms of common feature codes, it could happen that a
response feature code included in the task set may be
activated by a sensory code due to perceiving a (albeit task-
irrelevant) stimulus feature (automatic task cuing). In that
case the feature code would receive both exogenous exci-
tation directly originating from a sensory code due to
stimulus perception and endogenous excitation originating
from response planning. Note that the latter form of exci-
tation indirectly also originates from the stimulus but is
mediated by the task set. As a result, response planning
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may be facilitated or hampered due to interaction between
these pathways, yielding stimulus–response compatibility
(SRC) effects.
Crucially, these effects depend on both stimulus and
response coding. In HiTEC, responses are coded in terms
of their perceptual effects. During the action–effect learn-
ing phase, associations are strengthened between motor
codes and feature codes. The strengths of these associations
depend on the co-activation of these motor codes and
feature codes, which depends on both external stimulation
(not explicitly modeled in current simulations, all sensory
codes receive the same external input when excited) and
top down modulation (i.e., connectivity between sensory
codes, feature codes and task codes). Thus, as stated above,
the task set not only determines actual stimulus–response
translation (both controlled and automatic), it also influ-
ences how responses are coded (during action–effect
learning) and thereby how (controlled and automatic)
subsequent stimulus–response translation is carried out.
This influence of task instruction on stimulus–response
translation is explicitly demonstrated in Simulation 5,
where the instruction based connections automatically
result in specific recurrency that selectively enhances either
the ‘key’ or ‘light’ feature codes that in turn selectively
enhance either the haptic location codes or the visual
location codes when perceiving action effects. This leads to
differences in action–effect weight learning and subse-
quently in how a response is encoded. These differences in
response coding, in turn, influence the degree in which the
feature codes representing stimuli and responses overlap,
giving rise to different SRC effect directions across
conditions.
Note that all simulated studies are based on the main
assumption that in experimental settings human partici-
pants generally only respond to particular stimuli with
particular responses because they are instructed to do so.
Indeed, it has been shown that the stimulus-induced
response activation that underlies SRC effects can only be
obtained after the participant has implemented the required
task set (Valle-Incla´n & Redondo, 1998). In this study, the
stimulus–response mappings of the task (i.e., the task
instruction) varied randomly from trial to trial. In some
trials, the mapping instruction was presented followed by
the target stimulus. In other trials, the stimulus preceded
the mapping instruction. Their results showed that the
Simon effect was only observed in trials where the map-
ping instruction was presented before the stimulus. This
suggests the task set must be implemented before SRC can
occur.
Thus, understanding the task demands configures the
cognitive system to modulate both stimulus perception and
response planning. This involves attending to task-relevant
stimulus features (e.g., a high or low auditory pitch) and
preparing a small selection of motor schemas (e.g., press-
ing keys). In more general terms this process of configuring
the cognitive system is what we consider the main contri-
bution of cognitive control; it prepares the system to sub-
sequently act according to instruction—it in a sense turns
the system into a ‘prepared reflex’ (Hommel, 2000; see also
Bargh, 1989). Note that instruction wiring by itself ensures
attention for the right dimension(s), for example key
locations vs. light locations in Simulation 5. Indeed, as
cognitive control is implemented as mere connectivity
resulting from task instructions, there is—at least with
respect to the simulated experiments—no need for addi-
tional online control of the inner mechanisms.
Addressing the apparent crucial role of task goals in
SRC, Ansorge and Wu¨hr (2004) formulated the response-
discrimination hypothesis that states that response repre-
sentations are not automatically formed, but rather top-
down controlled. Only spatial features that discriminate
between alternative responses are represented and thus give
rise to a Simon effect. This resonates well with the con-
clusions in a general review by Proctor and Vu (2006) that
the Simon effect does not result from an automatic acti-
vation of a corresponding response by means of a hard-
wired (e.g., Kornblum, et al., 1990) or over-learned (e.g.,
Umilta` & Zorzi, 1997) route; rather the task defines S–R
associations that mediate this responding. HiTEC is clearly
consistent with this response-discrimination hypothesis and
provides a rationale, in terms of internalization of an
explicit task set using codes that are grounded in sensori-
motor experience, for how and why these response repre-
sentations are formed and top down modulated.
Limitations and future work
Although we have demonstrated that the current version of
HiTEC can simulate a variety of perception–action
experiments, its principles, processes, and properties are
still far from sufficient to account for all known phenomena
in this domain. Most notably, HiTEC yet lacks the ability
to bind features—an ability that was emphasized in the
original TEC (Hommel, et al., 2001). When an agent is
presented with two visual objects, say one blue and one
red, both ‘Blue’ and ‘Red’ sensory codes will be activated
concurrently and the present model has no means to code
or keep track which color belongs to which object (the
classic ‘binding problem’: Treisman, 1996). Given that
several empirical phenomena in the domain of perception–
action interactions are likely to reflect feature-binding
processes (Mu¨sseler & Hommel, 1997; see Hommel, 2004,
for an overview), extending HiTEC to include a binding
mechanism seems essential. From a modeling perspective,
such a binding mechanism may protect active representa-
tions from catastrophic interference (see Hommel, et al.,
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2001). Closely related is the impact of episodic memory on
perception and action planning (Waszak, Hommel, &
Allport, 2003). Not only the current task set but also recent
experiences with particular stimuli and actions (e.g.,
affective connotations, Haazebroek, van Dantzig, &
Hommel, 2009) under a particular task set can play a large
role in the later interpretation of stimuli and responses and
the efficiency with which their processing can be controlled
(Nuxoll & Laird, 2004).
In addition, action planning in HiTEC is currently
greatly simplified as we only allow one rather simple action
to be planned at a time. A more realistic model of action
control would include the planning, programming, and
coordination of more complex, hierarchical actions (Logan
& Crump, 2010) and action sequences (Herbert & Butz,
2012; Tubau, Hommel, & Lo´pez-Moliner, 2007). More-
over, the notion of planning may imply intention, a delib-
erate action actively chosen by an actor, rather than a
response. Indeed, we have not addressed intention explic-
itly and have focused primarily on responding to stimuli.
However, it is conceivable that also intended action may be
realized by actively anticipating action effects (see Hom-
mel, 2009 for a more detailed discussion). Another strong
addition would be the inclusion of conflict monitoring and
performance feedback along the lines of (Botvinick, et al.,
2001). The experience of response conflict and/or of neg-
ative feedback might strengthen the activation state of goal
codes and their impact on stimulus–response processing,
which would tend to prevent errors in the future (van
Steenbergen, et al., 2009).
Nevertheless we hope to have shed some light on the link
between perception and action codes in cognitive processing
across different experimental paradigms. Although HiTEC
may seem to be a simple model considering its architecture,
its recurrent connections yield complex dynamics. HiTEC
complements available models by providing a rationale for
why some stimulus–response relationships are privileged,
and how they can be both automatic and context-dependent
at the same time, how situation-specific meanings of
responses emerge, and how they modulate sensorimotor
processing. The HiTEC model is intended as a proof of
principle, how common representations may mediate the
interaction between perception and action in a stage-less
way, addressing issues of action knowledge, automaticity
and task demands, all relevant for effective behavior.
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Appendix
See Table 1.
Table 1 Parameters and values as used in the HiTEC simulations discussed in this article
Category Parameter Value
External inputs External input (stimulus, motor execution) 0.5
Sensory weights Sensory—feature forward 0.4
Sensory—feature backward 3.0
Task—feature weights (Stimulus) feature—task forward, and task—(response) feature forward 1.3a
(Response) feature—task backward, and task—(stimulus) feature backward 0.2
Inhibition Excitatory to inhibitory paired unit 1.25
Inhibitory to other excitatory codes within layer -0.75
Activation parameters da Decay parameter 0.1
b
qa Sigmoid parameter in response function 0.9
na Sigmoid parameter in response function 4
c Scale parameter 0.9
Noise Mean 0.025
Standard deviation 0.001
Thresholds Voltage threshold (VT) 0.5
Learning threshold (LT) 0.55
Response threshold for motor code selection 0.7
Weight parameters Weight decay (dw) 0.0005
a 0.8 for ‘other’ features (i.e., key, light, sound)
b 0.2 for sensory codes
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